


Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics

Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
LBJ School of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin

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Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention and Its Potential Consequences



Explanations for Rebellions by Groups Vulnerable to Genocidal Retaliation

1	Don't perceive credible threat by state to retaliate
2	Expect victimization anyway, so nothing to lose
3	Expect victory at tolerable cost w/o intervention
4	Expect intervention to enable victory at tolerable cost
5	Don't behave as unitary rational actors

Bosnia: Examples of Evidence

- Izetbegovic: “Our tactics were . . . the international community would defend this country.”
- Silajdzic: “My main priority in the whole strategy was to get Western governments and especially the United States to get involved, because [Serbs] had the whole Army.”
- Behmen says the goal was to “put up a fight for long enough to bring in the international community.”

Kosovo: Examples of Evidence

- Xhemajli: “We knew our attacks would not have any military value. Our goal was not to destroy the Serb military force [but to make it] become more vicious. . . . We thought it was essential to get international support to win the war.”
- In May 1998 KLA official quoted saying intention is to “attract heavy Yugoslav barrages and thus win strong international sympathy, as the Croats did in Vukovar.”
- Negotiator Gorani: “There was this foreign diplomat who once told me, 'Look unless you pass the quota of five thousand deaths you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo from the foreign diplomacy.’”

Cost-Sharing

Insurance Prescription	Analogy for Intervention	Prospects?
Deductible	Violence threshold for intervention.	No. Insufficient to deter rebels.
Coinsurance	Inadequately protect rebels and civilians.	No. Not credible.
Cap Payout	Help civilians, not rebels.	Maybe. But rebels and their goals will be aided.

Randomization

Insurance Prescription	Analogy for Intervention	Prospects?
Constructive Ambiguity	Avoid clear criteria for intervention.	No. Already exists.
Hinder Lobbying by Insured	UNSC monopoly on intervention.	No. States insist on right to intervene.

Regulation

Insurance Prescription	Analogy for Intervention	Prospects?
Ex-Ante	No intervention if rebels provoke retaliation.	Maybe. But CNN effect creates pressure to intervene.
Ex-Post	Aid groups that end violence and reduce aims.	Maybe. But initial violence still rewarded.

Other Methods

Insurance Prescription	Analogy for Intervention	Prospects?
Risk-Based Premiums	Support non-violent groups rather than rebels.	Maybe. But political will lacking until violence.
Limited Guarantees	Cap contributions to a single intervener.	No. States insist on right to intervene.
Mutual Liability	Vulnerable groups decide third-party intervention.	No. States won't delegate intervention decisions.

Proposed Reform of Humanitarian Intervention

- No intervention on behalf of rebels unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate.
- Expend substantial resources to persuade states to address the legitimate grievances of non-violent domestic groups, including golden parachutes for oppressive leaders who step down.
- Do not coerce regime change or surrender of sovereignty without robust preventive military intervention to protect against violent backlash.
- Deliver purely humanitarian aid – food, water, shelter, medical care – in ways that minimize benefit to rebels.