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the newsletter of economists for peace and security

The Global & Human Security Issue

We are given to understand that the effective choice is between laissez-faire and chaos... the conventional wisdom, to coin a phrase.

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Global Security, the Liberal Peace, and Human Security

Susan Willett

The end of the Cold War expanded the reach of international institutions and brought to the fore the possibility of achieving a Kantian Peace. Through a mixture of coercion and consent, the contemporary liberal peace project has endeavored to spread democracy, the rule of law, human rights, global economic integration, free markets and neo-liberal reforms, in an attempt to secure global peace. It contains different interpretations that include emancipatory, orthodox and conservative tendencies.

Emancipatory model of liberal peace

Based on custodianship, consent and local ownership, the emancipatory model adopts a bottom-up approach to peace-building and security. It seeks to challenge the traditional power relations between the global North and South, prioritizing social justice across the economic, political, cultural and security spectrum. This model has given rise to the human security paradigm; a rights-based response to the “new security threats” of poverty, economic inequality, pandemic diseases, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and natural disasters has emerged within the emancipatory model of the liberal peace. The concept of human security is based upon the notion of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” and contains seven distinct but interrelated aspects of security;

Economic security: an assured basic income either through employment or through the provision of social safety nets. Just under 20% of the population of the developing

world lives in extreme poverty (less than \$1 a day). In sub-Saharan Africa 44% of the regional population live in extreme poverty. High unemployment of male youth has been identified as an important factor underlying political tensions and ethnic violence in Africa.

Food security: access to basic nutrition. In 2004, 28% of the population of the developing world suffered from hunger.

Health security: a minimum of protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles. In developing countries infections and parasitic diseases are the major cause of death killing 17 million people per annum. Most of these deaths are linked to poor nutrition and lack of access to clean water. AIDS has become the greatest threat to health security.

Environmental security: protection from the effects of the deterioration of the natural environment.

Personal security: guarantees protection from physical

violence, whether from state or non-state actors, from domestic abuse or from crime.

Community security: protection from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.

Political security: aims to honor people’s basic human rights. Enables people to live in societies free of political repression and torture.

Rooted in a needs- and rights-based policy discourse, the human security paradigm seeks to eradicate the root causes of conflict in the world. It challenges traditional state-centric models of both security and development.

The concept of human security is based upon “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.”

Table 1. Overseas Development Assistance, Selected Years

Annual Total Assistance (US\$ bn)					
	1990	2002	2003	2004	2005
All Developing Countries	52.7	58.3	69.1	76.6	106.5 (projected)
LDCs*	15.2	15.9	22.5	23.5	
Share of OECD/DAC Gross National Income %					
All Developing Countries	0.33	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.33
LDCs*	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.08	

*Least Developed Countries. Source: UN MDG Database 2006

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are an attempt to redress the problems of underdevelopment associated with human insecurity. The MDGs aim to halve income poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education and gender equality, reduce under-5 mortality by two thirds and maternal mortality by three quarters, reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, halve the proportion of people who live without access to clean water, and address environmental degradation, by the year 2015. The main problem is the lack of adequate Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding (see Table 1, above).

Debt relief accounts for over half of the ODA increase, but debt relief is no guarantee that resources will be released into poverty reduction. Emergency aid and disaster relief form another large component of the increase, which, although necessary, do not address the long-term development needs of the world's poorest countries.

Donors' lack of commitment to the MDGs in general and to the emancipatory notion of human security in particular reflects a reluctance to relinquish control over development and security discourse and practice.

The orthodox or institutional model of the liberal peace

The orthodox or institutional liberal peace is based on widespread consent between donors - multilateral agencies including the UN, EU, international financial institutions (IFIs), and NGOs - that conflict reso-

lution in the South can be achieved through a number of interconnected processes involving the economic, social and political transformation of chaotic or collapsed states. Its methodologies, objectives and norms seek to impose the liberal peace through a series of interventions, including peacekeeping, peace building and state reconstruction. The IFIs and major donors assume that "free markets" and global integration will resolve economic marginalisation, inequality, grievance and social injustice, despite the fact that there is no tangible evidence to suggest that free markets alone do anything other than exacerbate inequalities and feed social tensions in the worlds poorest and most conflict prone countries.

Peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction policies attempt to reproduce an idealized type of Western democratic peace via good governance reforms, which seek to control, rather than empower citizens. The adoption of a "one model fits all" methodology pays little attention to the particularities of local history, politics, custom, grievances or economic reality. Externally imposed *peace-as-governance* is presented as a transitional phase, but in most cases peace without external governance is unsustainable. Evaluations of failure rarely if ever question methods or goals. Blame is apportioned to local actors, lack of political will, greed or corruption. The adoption of "greed" as a causal explanation for conflict in the developing world deflects attention from the structural caus-

es of conflict, which may implicate the existing system of global governance. Belief in the superiority, universality and infallibility of the liberal peace prevents any objective assessment or alternative discourse on peace and security from being heard.

The concept of human security, while recognized,

is watered down by a donor community concerned with short-term conflict management policies. Focusing solely on freedom from fear, the concern is to protect individuals from violent conflict, hence the prioritization of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Where preventative measures fail remedial action is undertaken, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, improving law and order, prohibiting child soldiers and banning illegal small arms and landmines. The UN, the main global institution tasked with humanitarian intervention and peace building, is hard pressed to meet the ever-increasing demands placed upon it. The United Nations and its agencies (e.g., United Nations High Commission on Refugees; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Food and Agricultural Organization; International Labor Organization; World Health Organization; United Nations Industrial Development Organization) spend about \$20 billion per annum, or about \$3 per capita of the world's population. Many member states fail to pay their dues in full and have reduced their donations to the UN's voluntary funds. Arrears to the regular Budget amounted to \$1,206 million in May 2006, of which \$675 million was owed by the United States. This represents 56% of the regular budget arrears (see Figure 2, page 4).

(continued on page 4)

Letter from the Director

A couple of years ago, when we were contemplating changing the name of Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, we had to think how to succinctly express our goals and aspirations. We knew that we preferred peace over war, but that seemed a little simplistic. Some wise minds, among the many available to us, suggested that we include security as one of our guiding principles. "Peace," like "love" and "art," is so obviously preferable that it can be a real conversation-stopper. But the word security leads to rich discussion.

What is security? Traditionally one of the main functions of government has been to provide security for its people. This led to the need for boundaries (what part of the world are we responsible for protecting?), armies (how do we protect it?), and other instruments of "defense." In the United States, founded on the principle that the government should stay out of its citizens' lives and be as small as possible, the "defense" budget now swallows more than half of all discretionary spending. The dominant paradigm constricts security within very narrow terms: only government can provide national security, and the strongest instrument for that provision is a robust military.

In recent years, many have begun to question this traditional, narrow view of security. Is protecting its citizens from attack by other governments (or even non-state actors) the full extent of the contract between a government and its people?

As we became Economists for Peace and Security, we decided to embrace the broadest possible understanding of what constitutes security. We rewrote our mission statement to begin with language borrowed from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

In recognition [that] the inherent dignity and equal rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world; and [that] everyone is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation, of the economic, social, cultural and security rights indispensable for dignity and the free development of personality.

In this view, security becomes an inherently economic concept, and we can begin to ask what conditions must prevail in order for peo-

ple's lives to encompass these rights. What are we willing to trade for freedom from fear - not only of invading armies, but also domestic violence, crime, and prejudice? What incentives could we create to guarantee that everyone gets enough food, water, clean air, health care, leisure time, etc. to be free from want?

The Bush administration absolutely subscribes to an economic view of national security. If access to energy supplies (especially oil) is vital to the economy of our country, then oil is a national security issue and we have the right to secure that access through any means necessary. But if we hold as the bottom line not the protection of the state but the protection of the individuals who live within that state, we will be able to make wiser decisions that lead in fact to more real security.

We come quickly to the realization that many of the issues most important to the individual are not constrained by arbitrary national borders. In today's interconnected world, we have a great opportunity to cross boundaries and address issues of global security such as climate change, water rights and weapons of mass destruction.

I was thinking recently about the situation that led to the founding of the UN and the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Perhaps what distinguishes a world war from any other is not how many countries are involved, but the fact that when it's over the devastation has been so great that a majority of the planet's governments see the need to do something new and different, to institute an entirely new paradigm in the hopes of averting another such catastrophe.

Our organization was founded on the belief that a deep care for the well-being of the individual and an abiding awareness of the larger context must go hand in hand. This belief draws us back again and again to the principles embodied in the UN - we are all in this together, and we had better work together for solutions.



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
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Global Security, the Liberal Peace and Human Security (continued from page 2)

Figure 2. Member States' Total Debt vs US Total Debt to the UN



Source: United Nations: 2006 Status of Contributions to the Regular Budget, International Tribunals, Peacekeeping Operations and Capital Master Plan

The US, rather than support UN multi-lateral principles has been intent on bending UN policies to its own foreign and security agenda, circumscribed by a conservative approach to the liberal peace.

The conservative model of the liberal peace

The *conservative* model of the liberal peace dominates the global security system. It is informed by the unilateralist and exceptionalist policies of the United States. The use of force via cutting edge military technology such as the revolution in military affairs, over the horizon warfare, ballistic missile defenses, and tactical nuclear weapons is viewed as the only viable way to secure the “democratic peace” in an unpredictable and unstable world.

This form of liberal peace comes at a high price. The US military budget reached \$478

\$1001 billion in constant 2003 prices. This corresponds to 2.5% of global GDP, an average cost of \$173 per capita. Advocates of high military spending in the US argue that it allows other nations to spend less. This contention supports the theory that a global hegemon is a stabilizing force for the world.


The vast sums spent on military hardware and the prosecution of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have done little to enhance global security. The US/UK “War on Terror” has resulted in an increase in support for jihad in the Muslim world. Far

from enhancing the spread of democracy, the War on Terror has led to human rights abuses, the erosion of the rule of law, and an increase in human insecurity across the globe. Washington and London deny that their policies have unhinged global security. In the economic sphere the conservative model is associated with neo-liberal economic strategies, particularly the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank. Despite the growing evidence of the destabilizing nature of neo-liberal policies in fragile states the US, IMF and World Bank continue to compel poor nations to adopt neo-liberal policies at inappropriate times, often with devastating impacts on human security. Unbridled market forces have increased inequality in wealth and power, fueled the sense of grievance, and intensified societal tensions.

A durable disorder

Aspects of all three forms of the liberal peace are to be found operating in parallel in various conflict zones around the world. The high degree of incompatibility between them, particularly between the conservative and emancipatory models, contributes towards the friction and contradictions in conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction policies. Strains exist between the processes of democratization and government reform, local ownership of development and neo-liberal reforms, crime and corruption and the establishment of the rule of law and the stabilization of a society and post-conflict justice.

Figure 3. World Military Expenditure, 1988-2005
in billions of US\$ at constant 2003 prices



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2006 (no data available 1990 - 1992)

Resources remain disproportionately allocated to the conservative model of the liberal peace. Allocations to global military expenditure are ten times larger than global allocations to the MDGs, reflecting the priorities of a global security system that puts war and destruction before development and human security.

These trends have produced what Duffield (2001) describes as a durable

disorder - a system of international governance that, through constant crisis management, avoids systemic collapse in the face of new and continuous security threats, but singularly fails to resolve the root causes of global conflict.

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Sources for this article are available online at: <http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/nov2006/willett.htm>

Making Military Expenditure Data Relevant

Wuyi Omitoogun

Introduction

The traditional definition of security, which emphasizes the defense of the state and the armed forces, is steadily giving way to another that places the individual at the heart of the security equation. According to an observer of the evolution of the security concept, "if the 20th century can be characterized as the century of conflict, ideology and 'national security state,' perhaps the 21st will unfold under the sign of 'human security.'" The traditional concept of security focused on the armed forces as the main instrument of securing the state. In the new and expanded definitions of the concept, the individual is the referent object and a menu of instruments other than the military is available to meet the emerging security challenges. Military expenditure data (Milex) have been one of the tools used in the analysis of traditional state-centric security and for decades have been useful as a measure of the resources that the state commits to military activities as opposed to expenditure on providing other public goods. The implication of deeper and broader definitions of security, and in particular the shift from the state to the individual as the referent object, is that military expenditure data are no longer a sufficient measure of resources devoted to security activities, since security is no longer synonymous with the security or defense of the state.

Milex and expanded definition of security

The new conceptualization also has implications for how security expenditure is

defined. The expansion of the concept of security beyond the state and the military implies that several security-related expenditures other than military expendi-

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ture are relevant for our understanding of security. Unfortunately, data on expenditure on other parts of the security sector are either not sufficiently developed or do not yet exist in a format that will allow their use in the same manner as military expenditure data. To date, a well-developed definition of expenditure exists only for the military sector with standardized data that are processed and analyzed by a few institutions such as SIPRI.

Although such datasets have a number of reliability and validity problems, they are sufficiently well developed to allow for some time series analysis and cross-country comparison, exercises that aid our understanding of expenditure dynamics of security policies.

For other parts of the security sector, the data situation is much less satisfactory. As a result, these data are difficult to interpret and not particularly useful in complementing other indicators to measure total security expenditure.

Thus, there is a need to focus on some areas of the expanded security concept

(especially internal security) that could complement military expenditure data and facilitate our understanding of the new security issues through quantitative data as well as provide a comprehensive picture of resources being devoted to security broadly defined. Military expenditure already has a relatively established definition, and available datasets that can allow a discussion of traditional security expenditure with a focus on the armed forces. This will require a pilot study, because countries have different traditions and practices when it comes to internal security. A study of a few countries will therefore be useful to identify the relevant components of internal security on which to collect quantitative data, do a conceptual clarification of these components to limit the extent of coverage, assess the feasibility of accessing national data on a regular basis, and describe how they would aid our understanding of the new security environment.

Complementing milex with internal security data

What both definitions have in common is that the individual is the referent object, rather than the state, as in the traditional definition of security. In developing a complementary indicator for military expenditure data to measure total security expenditure, this short piece proposes a focus on the more limited definition of human security, conceptualized as freedom from fear.

1. Many poor people in developing countries have identified physical safety

(freedom from fear) as their greatest need. The *Human Development Report 1994*, which first introduced the idea of human security, identified physical safety of the individual as one of the greatest challenges to human security. Internal security forces handle the task of mitigating this fear in most countries of the world. In addition, this aspect of human security seems closest to the traditional definition of security to which military expenditure data have been most useful as an indicator. To develop a new data series on internal security would therefore be both relevant and feasible, and would contribute to the understanding of the full extent of resources devoted to the new, broad definition of security.

2. In the developing world the dividing line between the external role of the armed forces and the internal function of other security forces is blurred in many countries. This is mainly because of a lack of (or lack of regard for) differentiation between external and internal security tasks for the armed forces and other internal security forces (police in particular) in the traditional Western sense. Developing a new data series on internal security expenditure would therefore, along with

military expenditure data, capture the totality of expenditure on security in most of the countries in this group. In addition, adding only the physical safety aspect of the human security definition will provide

**The Human Development
Report 1994
identified physical safety
of the individual as
one of the greatest
challenges to
human security.**

the opportunity to examine the extent of resources for providing security for the state and its people, compared to the resources devoted to meeting the other aspect of human security—namely the freedom from want, or what may be called the development aspect of security.

3. Since the 9/11 events in the United States, the dividing line between internal security and external defense has begun to be blurred, even in the developed world,

which again supports the view that expenditure for both aspects of security be combined to get the true picture of expenditure on security. The Task Force on A Unified Security Budget for the United States has already commenced an annual exercise of assessing the total security expenditure of the US in view of the new security demands since 9/11 and the seemingly unchanged pattern of security expenditure of the US. The Unified Security Budget for the United States project is not, however geared towards developing any index or indicators.

There is no doubt that military expenditure data have been useful for security analyses over the years. There remains a need to develop complementary datasets on emerging security challenges such as internal security, to complement military expenditure data series for a comprehensive analysis of total security expenditure.

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Common Security

Dietrich Fischer

To prevent war it is important to criticize wrong policies - such as bombing civilians to end terrorism - but this is not enough. We must also propose alternatives. The following analogy suggests a better way.

Few of us are in a position to make daily decisions about national security, but we are all familiar with another environment prone to conflict, which is road traffic. Let's compare the two.

Until about 1880, there were no traffic laws. Whoever was more aggressive crossed an intersection first, as pedestrians still do on sidewalks. But with the invention of motor vehicles, collisions became more dangerous, and something had to be done.

The solution was to create traffic laws:

- We observe certain rules, such as driving on the right (or left in some countries), stopping at red lights and obeying speed limits.

- We drive more carefully than the law requires, to avoid accidents even if others make mistakes.

- We undertake a course of study to learn to drive and must pass a test before obtaining a license.

- We build safe roads, wide enough for two vehicles to pass, with fences along cliffs, etc.

All these measures improve the common safety of everyone, not only our safety at the expense of others. Though accidents still happen when these rules are violated, it is clear that without rules we would be much worse off.

Nuclear weapons have now made war far too dangerous. To wait until war breaks out and then to react with military force is comparable to driving a car with closed eyes until we hit something and then reacting, instead of looking ahead to avoid dangers.

Similarly, we must now pursue an active peace policy that seeks to avoid or resolve conflicts long before they lead to war. What would a security policy based on analogous principles look like?

First, we would observe international law and cooperate with other nations to

strengthen it. The United States' refusal to accept jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court sets a bad example for others and makes the world more dangerous.

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Even if others violate the law, it is not in our interest to do the same. Even if others run red lights, it does not help us to imitate their folly.

Some argue that international law restricts our sovereignty and freedom. But only by adhering to certain mutually beneficial norms can we gain better control over our destiny. Clearly, traffic laws restrict our freedom to drive zigzag, but give us the more important freedom to reach our destination safely and on time.

Second, a country should avoid provocative behavior. Some Americans wonder why the Iraqis are not more grateful to the United States for trying to convert their country into an image of the United States. But Americans would hardly appreciate it if Iraq invaded the United States and tried to convert it into a God-fearing Islamic republic.

Third, it is ironic that anyone must pass a driving test before being allowed to drive a car, but before taking control of the nuclear arsenal, a President only needs to pledge to defend the constitution. Would we issue a driver's license to anyone based on a pledge to drive safely?

Of course, being elected is a kind of test, but more a test of popularity than competence. Imagine a group of air travelers choosing the most popular among them to be their pilot. This could be a prescription for disaster. Like controlling an

airplane, defusing international conflicts is a skill that can be taught and learned. Good intentions alone are not sufficient. We would not allow our own mother to perform open-heart surgery on us, even though there is no doubt that she would have the best intentions. What would traffic look like if we applied the same principles that now guide our national security policies?

"Flexible response," still NATO's official doctrine, threatens the first use of nuclear weapons against a conventional attack. This is as if we loaded our car with dynamite, wired to explode on impact, to kill anyone hitting us (and ourselves too). This should indeed deter others from hitting us intentionally, but the slightest accidental collision would mean our end.

Proponents of "preventive war" advocate destroying the forces of an opponent before he can use them, if war appears imminent. That would be like mounting a machine gun on our car, threatening to kill anyone who drove dangerously close to us. Others of course would be tempted to get an even bigger gun and, if in doubt, kill us before we could kill them.

"Star Wars" and other space-based weapons and defense systems are no solution either. They are like driving over a cliff assiduously wearing a safety belt.

Some argue that we will have to live with nuclear weapons as long as civilization exists, because they cannot be un-invented. We have not un-invented cannibalism either, but we abhor it. Can't we learn to abhor equally the thought of incinerating our planet?



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Information and Global Security: A Cautionary Tale?

Raul Caruso

Is there a relation between information and security? Does more information lead to a more secure world? These questions are not new. The spread of information is often linked with the advancement of liberal ideas - like human rights concerns, the promotion of democracy, and the development of civil society. This also appears to be confirmed by anecdotal and historical evidence. Dictatorships have always been committed to the restriction and manipulation of information through several means.

In this decade, information circulation has witnessed unprecedented growth. It is constantly disseminated through newspapers, magazines, TVs, radios and the internet. The evolution of the latter, in particular, has established a new frontier in information management and circulation.

However, a huge disparity in the access to the world wide web does exist. According to Internet World Stats, estimates for 2006 show that 69% and 38% of North Americans and Europeans respectively have access to Internet, while only 3.6% of Africans and 10.8% of Asians do.

What I suggest here is a reconsideration of the well-known proposal of closing the digital divide, which, a decade ago, seemed to constitute a major issue for international organizations like the UN and the World Bank. This proposal now appears to be gone for good. However, re-evaluating such a proposal raises questions about the role of information and its circulation.

As economists, we often tend to believe in a benign impact of information on individuals' choices. However, there are several theories suggesting an ambiguous impact of information. I espouse one of them: the theory of cognitive dissonance as expounded by Leon Festinger. The basic idea underpinning this theory is that people are uncomfortable with contradictory ideas. Feasible reactions to dissonance are (a) changing one or more beliefs; (b) acquiring new information to increase the existing consonance; (c) reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions.

Thus, on one hand, individuals may have a tendency to deal with dissonance by

searching for new information. This could contribute to shaping the beliefs of individuals, making them persistent over time. If I were sure to have "God on my side," I could search for information confirming that I am

While surfing the internet, individuals are not simply exposed to information; they actually search for information.

firmly committed to the defeat of an unfaithful enemy. If I were completely sure that the "War on Terror" is devoted to eradicate terrorism and promote democracy, I could lower the relevance of the dissonant record of the Abu Ghraib tortures within the set of my beliefs.

On the other hand, dissonance created by the acquisition of new information can induce a change in my beliefs. Therefore, in the cases quoted above, I could modify my belief and no longer justify either the self-proclaimed leader who promotes violence based upon religious beliefs or the "Commander in Chief."

This kind of approach appears to be particularly relevant for the world wide web. Contrary to other media, while surfing the internet, individuals are not simply exposed to information, they actually search for information. Then, if we believe in the cognitive dissonance theory, both the dissemination of information on the Internet and the evolution of the network become sensitive issues.

First, one should recall the nature of information itself. Information is often considered a public good - i.e., non-rival and non-excludable. Albeit desirable, this is not always the case. Public information is nothing but the disclosure of information already privately available to some. Once disclosed, information becomes a public good, but it still has a cost of production, transmission

and storage before it can be appropriate so it can become a private good. The circulation of information would depend also upon the availability of technology and the existence of high costs. In fact, in spite of the astonishing development in technologies, the fixed costs of internet access (communication lines and routers) still remain very high, while marginal costs are supposed to be almost negligible. But, the latter can be raised quite dramatically because of congestion. An adequate mechanism of pricing could contribute to solving this problem. If we recognize information as a public good, public subsidies to cover both the fixed and the marginal costs would represent a desirable policy.

Second, the internet exhibits the feature of positive network externalities. The value of the network is proportional to the number of users. However, there are still doubts about the exact law governing the evolution of the internet. Some studies show that it follows a power-law. This would shape mergers and connections between larger and smaller networks. This is a critical issue to be investigated, because the future infrastructure and stability of the internet will depend upon this too. Phenomena of concentration can arise and lead to the establishment - amongst millions of nodes - of a few major hubs governing the circulation of information. In such a case, one-sided information, misinformation and manipulation can follow.

It is easy to find empirical evidence in this respect. Upon searching "war on terror" on Google, the major search engine on the internet, the first three links (out of 88,800,000), are relative to a video game. (Since I am based in Italy, I report results as they appeared on the Italian version of Google. Please note that a web-surfer cannot jump to the American version of the website. This also would require more attention.) The next three links are CNN, a webpage of the US Defense Department and the BBC. The good news is that at the eighth place is Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia. Using another search engine (Alltheweb), video games do not appear,

but the rest is similar. The website of the US Defense Department appears first.

Thus, a global policy devoted to spreading Internet facilities all around the world, namely closing the digital divide, would constitute a desirable policy if and only if (a) public subsidies are included to cover both the fixed and the marginal costs and (b) adequate institutions of governance for the Internet are also established. As Luigi Campiglio argued, a kind of anti-trust insti-

tution for the Internet should be designed and could be fundamental for a balanced evolution of the web. I am aware that the latter proposal does constitute a slippery ground, given that management of the Internet has always been a highly politicized issue. However, what appears to me is that an indiscriminate development of the Internet could undermine - rather than favor - the spread of uncensored and independent information. In such a view, a global and

comprehensive policy on the World Wide Web could also contribute to global security.

Raul Caruso is at the Institute of Economic Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano (Italy). The author wishes to warmly thank Andrea Locatelli and Lou Zarro. Sources for this article are available online at: <http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/nov2006/caruso.htm>

Global Security and Human Security

Michael D. Intriligator

An overwhelming array of threats

Our planet, its many nations, and its billions of people all face a vast and sometimes overwhelming array of threats, an increasing number of which are existential. These threats include:

1. International trans-border wars (e.g. Iraq/Kuwait 1990 - 1991, US/Iraq 2003 - present);
2. Internal or civil wars (e.g. the current conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has led to millions of military, guerilla and civilian deaths);
3. Genocide and large-scale human rights abuses (e.g. Darfur);
4. National and international terrorism (e.g. Aum Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway system in 1995, the Islamist attacks on the transit systems of London and Madrid);
5. Paramilitary groups and crime organizations that can facilitate terrorist strikes (e.g. the IRA, FARC, and right-wing extremist groups in the US);
6. Proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
7. Pandemic threats due to infectious diseases (e.g. the 1918 - 1919 flu pandemic and the current possibility of a H5N1 strain of avian flu pandemic);
8. Other widespread diseases, especially AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria;
9. International financial instabilities, such as the 1997 - 1998 East Asia financial crisis that spread from Thailand to many other nations, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and even to Russia;
10. Protectionism, especially the EU Common Agricultural Policy and US subsidies for cotton and other crops that have had devastating effects on developing

nations and their populations;

11. Global climate change, global warming, and other environmental threats;

12. Natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornados, and tsunamis;

13. Poverty, hunger, and malnutrition;

14. Imbalance of energy supply and demand, particularly with the emergence of nations such as China and India as major demanders of energy at the same time that some energy supplies are being depleted or exhausted;

15. Failed and failing states.

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Current threats require cooperation

Some of these threats existed when the UN was created in 1945, while others are new. They represent immediate and major threats to the planet or the human species and thus endanger global security. Furthermore, they are interrelated. Because of globalization, a threat to one nation or region is a threat to all, with all mutually vulnerable. Indeed, many of these threats feed on one another in a deadly cycle.

A common feature of all these threats is that they cannot be addressed by one nation, no matter how powerful, acting alone. Rather they require international

cooperation, with increased reliance on existing but revitalized international institutions, including the UN and its affiliated bodies, and the creation of new international organizations. Many of these problems have regional or global significance and do not respect national boundaries. They demand coordinated remedial measures at national, regional and international levels - involving governments, NGOs, other international organizations, and the private sector.

For a system of global governance to deal effectively with fundamental threats to security, whether it be the UN or some successor organization, we will need to approach security from a global perspective rather than merely a national one. Our world is now so highly connected and interdependent that it is impossible to confine security to arbitrarily defined national frontiers.

Defining global security

In an address in 1993 I defined "global security" as the absence of threats to the vital interests of the planet, and I argued that this new concept should replace that of "national security." Furthermore, the idea of security must extend well beyond its traditional military dimension to encompass the interrelated military, political, economic, environmental, health and other threats I list above. Now is an opportune time to build global consensus on these issues, and the logical party to take the initiative would clearly be a revitalized UN. International cooperation will become increasingly important in achieving our shared global security goals. We will need new theories and analytic frameworks for

global security to replace traditional theories such as containment, balance of power, deterrence, and hegemonic stability.

Defining human security

“Human security” will be defined here as the absence of threats to the vital interests of individual people on a worldwide basis. In the words of the UN Development Programme, which originated the concept, human security is “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives,” involving both “safety for people from violent threats, such as organized conflict, gross violations of human rights, terrorism and violent crime” and “safety from non-violent threats, such as environmental degradation, economic crises, illicit drugs, infectious diseases and natural disasters.” These two concepts of security, global security and human security, are not inconsistent; rather, they are both complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The role of the UN

There has been much recent discussion of globalization, which is, of course, a reality in the current world system (see Intriligator, 2004). It should not be forgotten, however, that the current age of globalization is just the latest manifestation of this phenomenon. An earlier period of globalization, extending over the 19th century, from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, ended with four blows. The first was “The War to End All Wars,” World War I; the second was the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919; the third was the Great Depression starting in 1929; and the fourth was World War II, starting in Europe in 1939 and even earlier in Asia. The UN system today must be prepared to deal with comparable challenges in the future, including wars, pandemics, economic depression, and other threats.

In 1905, before these four blows materialized, the philosopher George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” The world system of the 21st century could travel the same disastrous route that the 20th century charted. We should consider the possible repetition of these earlier disasters and how they could be avoided through effective reform and revitalization of the UN system.

Indeed there are disquieting similarities between 1913 and now: the unprecedented threat of extreme nationalism then and that of global Islamist terrorism today, the Spanish flu pandemic lurking then and a potential avian flu pandemic lurking today. Therefore,

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I consider it vital that the UN take the global initiative on today's issues and major threats to the international system. In fact, when comparing 1913 and 2006, the presence of UN as an institution is the major difference in world affairs and the global system.

Restructuring the UN system: the role of international agencies, NGOs, multinational corporations, and others

One important example of global insecurity is the threat posed by the avian flu H5N1 strain. This virus has the potential to surpass even the 1918 - 1919 pandemic, which killed tens of millions of people worldwide. Are the World Health Organization and other international agencies affiliated with the UN as well as various national and multinational institutions able to deal with this threat? If not, should these agencies be reconceived or should new institutions be created to replace them?

I propose that the UN cooperate more closely with major institutions at the global or regional level. Many of these did not exist when the UN was created and are thus not part of the Charter; others play too small a role in “business as usual” at the UN. Among these institutions are non-governmental organizations or NGOs, particularly the international NGOs that are accredited to the UN and its constituent bodies (especially the Economic and Social Council).

These international NGOs are action

organizations with global constituencies and reach. For example, without the involvement and active participation of NGOs there would be no Landmines Treaty; nor would many of the various environmental conventions and treaties exist.

More could and should be done, however, to involve the NGOs in the operation of the UN and its various affiliates. As one example, my own NGO, Economists for Peace and Security, regularly participates in the Disarmament Week organized every October in New York by the UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs. This meeting provides an excellent opportunity for the UN to announce its plans in this area and to receive suggestions on new programs and initiatives by the participating NGOs. All UN agencies might follow this example and establish a regular time and place to meet with those international NGOs that are accredited to the UN.

Other major institutions should also be regularly involved in UN programs, including major international corporations, multinational banks and other financial institutions, workers’ associations, and other international organizations so as to deal cooperatively with the common threats that we all face. The last would include the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization, all of which operate independently of the UN.

Some connections along these lines already exist, but they are informal and haphazard. These organizations should schedule regular forums where these institutions can meet with appropriate UN agencies and officials both to receive information about their programs and to make suggestions for new initiatives. Attempts towards this kind of collaboration do occur, for instance at World Economic Forum or World Social Forum meetings, but the UN would be the more natural and better body to lead this cooperative approach to solving global problems.

In addition to standing institutions, ad hoc groups of organizations and nations can often focus productively on certain issue areas. A current example is the so-called “Quartet” of the UN, the US, the EU, and Russia in the Middle East peace process. Another is the EU3 of France, Germany, and Great Britain that has been negotiating with Iran to suspend enrichment activities.

Yet another example is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a practical response to the growing challenge posed by the worldwide spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI aims to impede illicit WMD-related trade to and from states of proliferation concern and terrorist groups. President George W. Bush launched PSI in May 2003. Under the initiative, countries commit to disrupting the illicit trade in WMD by interdicting vessels, aircraft or other modes of transport in their territory or territorial waters that are reasonably suspected of carrying suspicious cargo. For example, in October 2003, the US, UK, Germany and Italy, acting under the auspices of the PSI, stopped an illegal cargo of centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment destined for Libya.

The goals and objectives of the United Nations remain as important and relevant today as at the time of its establishment. Through sixty years of evolution, the UN structures are more streamlined, its working methods more effective and its various programs better coordinated. However, it remains an organization built for a different era. To meet the challenges and priorities of the present, the UN must modify its practices and strengthen its structure.

It must be recognized that not only security but also the very survival of our civilization is threatened by dangers as great as the danger of nuclear war, such as the threats to global security noted above. These dangers keep growing despite huge sums being spent on their containment. Meanwhile, modern basic science has created revolutionary possibilities to deal with these threats, and humankind cannot afford to ignore them. Their realization requires the same spirit of responsibility, excellence, and urgency as that which drove the defense-oriented projects in World War II.

Currently, a massive release of radioactivity from a nuclear waste disposal site, an earthquake in the middle of a major city, a large-scale outburst of violence, and any one of a formidable array of other quite possible disasters could cause millions of casualties, render a large part of the world uninhabitable, trigger a global economic depression, and even trigger a nuclear war. In addition, each country has become vulnerable to developments in other parts of the world that are outside its control.

Huge sums are being spent worldwide in an effort to contain these dangers by the massive application of existing technologies. These efforts may prevent a part of the potential damage, but, on the whole, they are ineffective. The factors destabilizing our civilization prevail, and the scale of possible catastrophes is rapidly growing. Ever-increasing spending is the usual, accepted response, whereas the actual solution is more effective scientific cooperation on a global scale.

We know from history and common sense that basic scientific research is pivotal to cop-

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ing with these threats. Indeed, since ancient times basic science has time and again rescued humanity from major threats, and sustained its development by creating a springboard to entirely new technologies. Among twentieth century examples are antibiotics, transistors and integrated circuits, synthetic fibers, and the green revolution, to name just a few. Frontier research of the last years continues this tradition, revealing new possibilities to cope with many of the present dangers. In the area of disaster reduction, for example, they include neutralization of the time bomb contained in radioactive wastes; the prediction of natural disasters; geo-engineering stabilization of megacities; the control of the traffic in chemical explosives; the control of telecommunication networks; and the prediction of social, economic, and political crises. In the area of sustainable development, they include the discovery of new mineral deposits; the creation of new materials and sources of energy; the development of new forms of transportation; and the processing of waste products and their conversion into energy or other useful products.

Research of such significance, urgency, and difficulty would require wide international collaboration engaging the top scientists and research facilities of many nations. Such collaboration will make feasible the goals that

no country can accomplish alone even if it controls large resources. The UN could play a central role in fostering these research projects through bold, innovative, and responsible leadership and new initiatives.

By way of summing up, we are already engaged in the Third World War against unprecedented common threats to humanity. The war has already started, but we have not yet recognized it, and the wake-up call may involve a catastrophe on a global scale. Basic research is among the decisive factors in this war. The UN must act as a global catalyst in merging the international resources of basic science in a new type of war effort, not in a shooting war or a cold war but rather in joint defense of survival and sustainable development of our civilization and in support of global and human security.

Clearly there are serious threats today to global security and human security, and, equally clearly, the current UN system is not prepared to deal with these threats. At the same time, these threats can be addressed through global cooperation, and a restructuring of the UN system can create a basis for addressing them. This article proposes two aspects of this restructuring. The first is UN cooperation with other major world players, including NGOs, major international corporations, multinational banks, and other international organizations as well as greater use of ad hoc groups of nations to deal with specific threats. The second is the UN taking a major role in fostering scientific breakthroughs that can address these threats. It is vital that the UN take the initiative on today's issues through a cooperative approach with NGOs and other international organizations as well as fostering scientific programs dealing with the very serious threats that we face.

Michael D. Intriligator is Professor of Economics, Political Science and Public Policy at UCLA. He is also Vice Chair of Economists for Peace and Security. This article was taken from "The Threat of Insecurity: Are We Meeting the Challenge?," originally presented at the New School of Athens (NSOA) conference held March 2006 in Athens, Greece.

Sources for this article are available online at: <http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/nov2006/intriligator.htm>

Remembering John Kenneth Galbraith

Robert Solow

It is a little known fact, a deservedly little known fact, that I was once Ken Galbraith's student. It would have been the fall of 1948 or the spring of 1949, probably in Ken's first year on the Harvard faculty. I was enrolled in a graduate seminar on agricultural economics, taught by John D. Black and J. K. Galbraith. Black was, in those days, a prominent personage around Littauer Center. I had never heard of Galbraith.

We already know how Ken Galbraith came to be involved in a seminar on agricultural economics. He enjoyed playing off his Ontario farm-boy roots against his persona as the most urbane of all modern economists. But what was I doing in that classroom? There was nothing rural in my experience. Indeed, my younger son, aged maybe 10 years, once sidled up to his mother and asked, conspiratorially, "Mom, just what *is* animal husbandry?" The explanation of my presence in that course is that in the 1940s and 1950s some of the best empirical economics anywhere was being done in places like the US Department of Agriculture and Iowa State University: masses of data were available to agricultural economists, and they were occupationally specialized to ask straightforward questions about everyday life. I liked that, and was hoping to learn about that brand of economics. However I cannot remember a single thing that went on in the Black-Galbraith seminar, though there may still be some who can.

That was the first time my personal trajectory intersected Ken's. He of course went on to become the towering figure we are celebrating today and tomorrow. I went on to become just the sort of economist he was forever warning you all to beware and distrust. We had our sharp disagreements from time to time. That was not avoidable: Ken generated a vast collection of ideas, and anyone who managed to agree with all of them could fairly be classified as lacking initiative. On the whole, I stand by my guns.

Nevertheless, despite these ups and downs, and despite our different ways of being an economist, on most current practical issues of policy I usually found myself on Ken's side of the controversy. In thinking about that fact, I have come to believe that it was because we both understood a very important proposition

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in economics or political economy, one that has become even more centrally important in view of the direction that much academic and non-academic thought has taken in the past few decades. I want to expand on this because I don't think I had ever explicitly formulated it before in quite this way, and I rather doubt Ken had either.

Everyone agrees that the only practically efficient way to organize a complex modern economy is through a system of interconnected, decentralized markets. History and theory have taught us that there is really no useful alternative. In some circles this thought has been elaborated and extended, either explicitly or implicitly (more often implicitly), until it amounts to the dogma that a decentralized market economy is a very delicate, fragile piece of economic machinery. There is only one way to preserve it, and that is to leave it alone. If you tinker with it, especially if the state tries to modify the outcome into something more acceptable on equity grounds,

unintended bad things will happen. Not unintended good things, you should notice: the law of unintended consequences is thought not to be symmetrical in this case. There is assumed to be a bias because there is just more territory on the downside than on the upside. There is a lot of efficiency to lose and not much of anything to gain. The only safe course, according to this way of thinking, is seriously to "leave it to the market," meaning to abstain from well-meaning activist policies. In short, we are given to understand that the effective choice is between *laissez-faire* and chaos. This set of ideas has become the conventional wisdom, to coin a phrase.

I think that Ken Galbraith saw early on that there is no good reason, either in theory or practice, to accept that picture of a market economy as an un-modifiable system that had to be allowed to do its thing, its usually unfair and in-egalitarian thing. Our essential point of agreement was that, if this was the state of professional opinion, then professional opinion was wrong.

This thought rarely comes to the surface in Ken's famous books; they are about something else. But it is a necessary part of *The Theory of Price Control* and of *The Affluent Society*, neither of which would work well without it. It seems to figure less in *Countervailing Power*, which depends more basically on deep imperfections of competition, but could easily be interpreted in the same way. I am not suggesting that he ever formulated this proposition in so many words; neither did I. It wasn't necessary to do so until conservative free marketeering began to take center stage. But I suspect he felt it in his bones, and would have said so if asked. Indeed *The Affluent Society* is almost as much about our society's fear of public policy as it is about deficient infrastructure.

Of course there are better policies and worse policies, and of course it is possible, if a government is doctrinaire enough, or or corrupt enough, or wrongheaded

enough, to screw up a market economy badly. But there are also reasonably efficient ways to achieve greater equality, or better public services, or a safer environment, or lower unemployment, without noticeably damaging the goose that lays the golden eggs. The notion that you mustn't try to do any of these things because the delicate constitution of "the" market economy is too vulnerable, that was the real butt of Ken's humor and scorn.

Just to end on a prosaic note, too prosaic for Ken but not for me - comparative advantage will have its way - I want to illustrate what I have been saying by referring very briefly to a large, ongoing research project in which I have been involved. It is sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation, and it is carrying out a detailed comparative study of low-wage work in six advanced, high-income economies: the US, France, Germany, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands. The point is that these countries are all comparable in the average standard of living they provide for their population. But they differ quite a lot in the way they deal with the least skilled and least productive of their workers, in the way they organize low-end jobs, and in their conception of an equitable society. It is a deep question as to how underlying economic conditions, historical experience and political culture determine these international differences. But Ken believed in the power of persuasion, or he would not have spent so much time trying to persuade.

There are also some common tendencies, including the usual suspects. For example, the low-end jobs tend excessively to fall to women, ethnically distinct immigrants, and the young, though to varying degrees in different countries. On the other hand, they all have more compressed wage (and income) distributions than the US, and they do not all have more unemployment or lower labor-force participation. For example, if you define a low-wage job as one paying less than two-thirds of the national median hourly wage, about 25% of all

jobs are low-wage in the US, and slightly less in the UK; but the incidence of low-wage work is only 6% in Denmark and Finland, and about 15% in France and Germany.

If you have been in an East Coast or West Coast hospital lately, you will have noticed that most of the menial jobs are done by Latinos, African Americans and

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Asians; but that is not the case in Denmark or France, though they have pretty good hospitals and substantial minority populations. Denmark leaves the determination of wages and working conditions mainly to collective bargaining between unions and employers' associations, with the government staying mostly out of it, while the Dutch give a much more substantial role to the state.

I can't get over some of these tidbits and the variety they document. Here is another one. The Dutch are the part-time champions of the world, and only two percent of the part-time workers say that they would like longer hours. I don't yet understand why, though it is interesting that there is now a law in the Netherlands forbidding employers to pay part-timers a lower hourly wage than they pay to full-timers doing the same job. Some of these countries have fairly low union membership, but the government can and does mandate the extension of negotiated wages to the rest

of the industry that had no part in the negotiations. When it was proposed in the Netherlands to put an end to this practice of mandatory extension, the employers' association protested so much that the proposal was abandoned. That was the Netherlands, mind you, not Mars.

It is still too soon to draw final conclusions from this research. I am using these bits and pieces now only to illustrate the proposition that there are several ways to run a high-income capitalist market economy, not just the sadly attenuated way that we have chosen to do it recently, on the pretense that there is no real room to maneuver. That was not Ken Galbraith's only message, but it was one of his main messages, at least since since *The Affluent Society*. I wish I had been able to convince him that you can talk a lot about the algebra of supply and demand, and even about general equilibrium, and with that apparatus you can not only embody the basic message but even strengthen it. Maybe

Jamie could have persuaded him.

Ken Galbraith must have been thoroughly bored by arch references to his height. The truth is that if he had been a foot shorter he would have been just as memorable as a deadly enemy of political and economic cant, as a force for political and economic justice, and - this is what I have been trying to get across - as someone who told some important truths that the orthodox storytellers miss. I can paraphrase about him what Seamus Heaney once said of the novelist Italo Calvino: If he does not put a foot wrong, it is because he is not a pedestrian economist.

Robert Solow is Professor of Economics at MIT and a trustee of Economists for Peace and Security. He gave this after-dinner speech at a conference commemorating John Kenneth Galbraith, at Harvard's Kennedy School in October 2006.

EPS at the 2007 ASSA Conference

January 5 - 7, 2007

Chicago, IL

ICAPE Speaker and Reception

Thursday, January 4, 6:30pm

Swissotel Grand Ballroom

EPS is a member organization of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE).

EPS Annual Membership Meeting

Saturday, January 6, 5:30pm to 6:30pm

New Orleans Room, Hyatt Regency

EPS's efforts depend heavily on the support of its members. As a member you are welcomed into a family of dedicated individuals committed to reducing dependence on military power, and to searching for political and institutional change through peaceful democratic processes. Our members contribute not only financially, but also with research, articles, and as speakers at events. By joining us you help to ensure that reasoned perspectives on essential economic issues will continue to be heard.

All are welcome to attend and learn more about EPS's activities in 2006 and those planned for 2007.

EPS Annual Joint meeting of the Board of Directors and Fellows

Sunday, January 7, 10:00am to 12:30pm

Burnham Room, Hyatt Regency

The Board of Directors represents the members of the organization in all financial, legal and programmatic matters. The Board is elected by the voting members, who are called Fellows. EPS Fellows serve as advisors and advocates for our organization. They are experts in the economics of war, conflict, and peace; in nonprofit management; or in communications.

This is a business meeting of the organization. Only Fellows in good standing are eligible to vote.

Save the Date

May 30 - June 1, 2007

EPS is hosting a conference

War and Poverty, Peace and Prosperity

at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

Annandale-on-Hudson, NY

Watch this space for more information

EPS at the 2007 ASSA Conference

January 5 - 7, 2007

Chicago, IL

EPS Roundtable - Out How: The Economics of Ending Wars

Friday, January 5, 10:15am

Columbus IJ Room

Chair: James Galbraith, *University of Texas at Austin*

Participants:

Thomas Schelling, *University of Maryland*

Clark Abt, *Abt Associates*

Linda Bilmes, *Harvard University*

Col. Douglas MacGregor, *Center for Defense Information, Straus Military Reform Project*

Michael Intriligator, *University of California at Los Angeles, Milken Institute*

Panel Session: Women and War, a joint session with IAFFE

Saturday, January 6, 2:30pm

Skyway 260 Room

Chair: Lourdes Beneria, *Cornell University*

Participants:

Jennifer Rycenga, *San Jose State University*

How Institutional Religious Structures Impede or Enhance Women's Participation on Issues of Peace, Security, Equality and Creativity

Derya Demiler, *Istanbul Bilgi University*

Gender Dimensions of Internal Displacement in Turkey

Jennifer Olmsted, *Drew University*

Gender and Military Occupation in Iraq and Palestine

Robert Reinauer, *University of Massachusetts - Amherst*

Women and Post-conflict Economic Reconstruction in Guatemala

Marguerite Waller, *University of California - Riverside*

Is Post-conflict Forced Prostitution a War Crime?

Discussant: Elizabetta Addis, *Universita degli Studi di Sassari*

EPS will have a booth in the exhibit hall, as we have at several past annual meetings.

Our booth will be at the far right as you enter the exhibit hall,
next to the coffee service.

We are looking for EPS members to volunteer to help staff the booth.

If you can spare an hour during the conference, please contact theaharvey@epsusa.org.

All EPS events are in the Hyatt Regency, the main conference hotel

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EPS Annual Dinner honoring

William Baumol

**Saturday, January 6 at 6:30pm
Regency D Room, Hyatt Regency, Chicago**

The Host Committee is chaired by Alan Blinder, *Princeton University*
and includes:

Elizabeth Bailey, *University of Pennsylvania*

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Edward Wolff, *New York University*

Michael Worls, *Thomson South-Western Publishers*

**The dinner is generously supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation and Thomson South-Western publishers.**

The evening will begin with an informal reception, followed by dinner and remarks
from Andrew Schotter, Ralph Gomory, Carl Schramm,
Alan Blinder and, of course, William Baumol.

As the Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research noted when awarding him its
2003 International Award for Entrepreneurship,

“William Baumol has a long and outstanding record of addressing the real problems of our world...
[His] ambition has been to extend mainstream economics to be compatible with a wider range of theoretical assumptions
and economic phenomena than the received model is capable of addressing in a relevant way.

In doing so Baumol has constantly built new bridges that link theory, policy and practice...

[He has mastered] the tools of the trade and insist[ed] that they be used...

to address real-life problems of great urgency.”

To register for the dinner, please contact Thea Harvey @ theaharvey@epsusa.org

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